Tripartite system may be deaf to workers’ voice

1,May:It is being argued by some industrial relations experts that Singapore was able to withstand the harshness of economic crises mainly due to the fact that its industrial relations system was based on a tripartite structure in which the state, employers and unions had developed an integrated decision-making apparatus.

Such an apparatus provided among other things for labour to have voice in national policies and as such Singapore’s economic, social and political system was spared the worst effects of crises.

However, since countries like Malaysia did not possess a well-developed tripartite structures of decision-making, the workforce had to face the onslaught of the crises and its effects.

Layoffs, retrenchment, loss of earning, contracting out of employment and others could have been avoided to some extent had Malaysia, and other countries in the region, adopted the tripartite structure of industrial relations something like that of Singapore.

The need for a joint-decision making system in the arena of industrial relations is a pertinent point but it is not clear that a mere adoption of a tripartite structure is the sole answer to the myriad problems faced by labour in the region.

The Singapore example of industrial relations is relevant. However, to what extent this particular model could be emulated or copied in other national settings is not clear.

To some extent, the concept of a tripartite industrial relations structure only provides a theoretical picture of a joint decision making apparatus where the principal actors have more or less equal standing in determining policies affecting a country.

But when in comes to the Singapore example, the mere presence of a tripartite structure does not mean that the actors operate or function in manner where labour obtains some measure of recognition.

Principal agents Given the history of Singapore’s labour relations, it must be borne in mind that the present tripartite structure was not something that evolved over the years through the effective cooperation of the parties involved, but a system that was imposed in the earlier years by the state to obtain maximum compliance from labour alone.

Of course, it not wrong on the part of International Labour Organisation (ILO) or any other international labour body to call for the institution of the tripartite system in countries where the input of labour is none or minimal in terms of effecting national policies.

But the ILO’s support for this system should not be construed as a support for a system that presently operates in Singapore. The ILO’s notion of a tripartite structure means, among other things, that a system of industrial relations that provides a kind of structural representation for the three principal agents and where labour is accorded some recognition in terms of its contribution.

In this context, the call made by ILO for a tripartite system in industrial relations should not be confused as ILO supporting the Singapore system of industrial relations.

While I am not sure what is the exact stand of ILO on labour matters in Singapore, I would venture to think that it too is bothered by the repressive system of labour relations in the country.

Comparatively high wages and standard of living of workers in Singapore might perhaps have the tendency to paint a favorable picture of industrial relations in general and the tripartite system in particular.

However, a review of Singapore’s labour relations in the past would easily indicate that the so-called tripartite system that was instituted was not so much based on the willingness of labour in general to enter into negotiations with the state or employers but was something that was imposed on labour in the larger context of the regime struggle’s against the forces of the left.

Material benefits To say that institutions of the industrial relations system in Singapore could have cushioned labour against the worse effects of Asian economic crises might not be entirely correct.

To obtain a larger more comprehensive picture of the differential impact of Asian financial crises in the region, one has to consider a host of other variables, such the nature of economic development, standard of living, wages, nature of production, the social system, political stability, nature of economy, and many others.

In other words, the industrial relations system in general and the tripartite system in particular is merely one variable among many others. It would be impossible to conclude on the basis of the industrial relations system alone the relative effects of the crises on labour.

In fact, one could make a more convincing case that industrial relations should not seen in isolation from other variables and only by considering the interplay of various political, economic, social and other forces can one make a convincing case as to why Singaporean workers were spared the worse excesses of the recent economic slump.

There is tendency on the part of some scholars somehow to link labour well-being with a sound industrial relations system. But such hypothetical link might not really stand to strict empirical verification because there is always the possibility for workers to obtain sound material benefits without them having a full and democratic participation in the system.

Government agents As everybody with some knowledge of Singapore knows, institutions in the country, be they political, economic or social, operate on the basis of hierarchical authoritarian structure with little or no participation from below.

In the case of labour, while labour might be represented in certain national councils, the councils actually function for all intents and purposes like government agencies.

Leaders of the labour movement are merely considered as government agents rather than representatives of labour. Singapore is developed city state with modern infrastructure and the production locations in Singapore require more human resources skills than Malaysia or the Philippines.

This seems to be the main reason why the worker force in Singapore can command better wages than those in other countries of Southeast Asia.

Really, when we are comparing Singapore with other countries such as Malaysia or Philippines it is important to bear in mind that we are not talking so much about the industrial relations system but more about the different stages of development attained by these countries, at least from a conventional economic perspective.

Furthermore, there is hardly an empirical link between the tripartite system and the manner of labour participation. In Singapore, labour has been incorporated in this system, but do they have the strength of voice like the government or employers?

The mere presence of tripartite system is no assurance that labour will have a meaningful participation, let alone jointly determine the terms and conditions of its existence and reproduction. It is perfectly possible for a system to provide good material benefits for labour without the presence of a strong labour voice.

This is the principle of the Singapore government from Day One. Support the government, listen to the government, abide by the dictates of the government, the government will take care of the society as a whole.

Of course, today many Singaporeans, having enjoyed the fruits of their subservience, are beginning to have serious doubts about the philosophy of the PAP government. Broader context In the final analysis, I think it is wrong to argue that labour welfare is strongly dependent on whether a country in Southeast Asia has a tripartite industrial relations system.

Even if we think that Singapore has this structure, it would be difficult for other countries to emulate this model of industrial relations. As it was pointed out, the mere label of tripartite structure is no clue to assume that labour has a voice in the determination of national policies.

Alternatively, it is the argument of this author that a comparative picture of industrial relations sub-system must be studied and examined in a broader political, social and economic context.

Mere mechanical comparisons of industrial relations practice among countries might not provide a realistic picture of the situation of labour.

P RAMASAMY is a professor of political economy at the Political Science Department, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and has academic interests in Malaysian politics and labour. He has written quite extensively and is currently focusing on conflict management in Sri Lanka.

source:malaysiakini.com